Operational efficiency analysis of Beijing multi-airport terminal airspace

Multi-airport systems are growing in number and size globally, despite being afflicted by known inefficiencies due to the interferences between the flows of neighbouring airports. A macroscopic empirical approach is proposed in this paper to estimate the capacity penalties and demonstrated by a numerical case study for Beijing, which is projected to become one of the busiest metroplexes in Asia. The Pareto envelopes of the theoretical and observed peak hour capacities are statistically analysed to quantify the penalties in a comparable metroplex and are subsequently modulated by a sigmoid correlation function. The analysis predicts the practical capacity of Daxing, the penalty incurred by the pre-existing Capital airport and by the total multi-airport system. Various findings are drawn and discussed, highlighting the needs for further research.     

One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates

We consider optional time-of-use (TOU) pricing for residential consumers, offered by a publicly regulated electricity supplier, as an alternative to a single TOU or flat rate structure. An equilibrium model explores and quantifies the effects of such pricing on welfare, consumption, and production costs. The supplier offers to each household a menu of possible rate structures obtained by maximizing a collective welfare function subject to three restrictions: Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, sufficiency of supplier revenue to cover costs. Simulations based on realistic calibration of the model demonstrate that optional pricing can increase overall consumer welfare and reduce average cost.     

Optimum government size and economic growth in case of Indian states: Evidence from panel threshold model

This paper investigates the relationship between optimum government size and economic growth using data of Indian states during 1990-91 to 2017–18. Our results derived from panel threshold regression model show a positive and significant impact of government size on economic growth within the estimated thresholds for both aggregate and sub-panels based on income and regions. Once the government size moves above the upper threshold level, then its impact declines and turns to be insignificant. Thus, our findings suggest the policymakers for maintaining the government size within the thresholds limit.     

Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section

Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006 Akamatsu, T., Sato, S., &; Nguyen, X. L. (2006). Tradable time-of-day bottleneck permits for morning commuters (in Japanese). JSCE Journal of Infrastructure Planning 62(4), 605–620.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993 Arnott, R., de Palma, A., &; Lindsey, R. (1993). Properties of dynamic traffic equilibrium involving bottlenecks, including a paradox and metering. Transportation Science 27(2), 148–160.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.     

Arrow–Debreu equilibria for rank‐dependent utilities with heterogeneous probability weighting

We study Arrow–Debreu equilibria for a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents having heterogeneous probability weighting and outcome utility functions. In particular, we allow the economy to have a mix of expected utility agents and rank‐dependent utility ones, with nonconvex probability weighting functions. The standard approach for convex economy equilibria fails due to the incompatibility with second‐order stochastic dominance. The representative agent approach devised in Xia and Zhou (2016) does not work either due to the heterogeneity of the weighting functions. We overcome these difficulties by considering the comonotone allocations, on which the rank‐dependent utilities become concave. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of comonotone Pareto optima, and derive their characterizing conditions. With the aid of the auxiliary problem of price equilibria with transfers, we provide a sufficient condition in terms of the model primitives under which an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists, along with the explicit expression of the state‐price density in equilibrium. This new, general sufficient condition distinguishes the paper from previous related studies with homogeneous and/or convex probability weightings.     

A practical solution to the problem of ultimate ruin probability

Abstract

It was the Swiss actuary Chr. Moser who, in lectures at Bern University at the turn of the century, gave the name “self-renewing aggregate” to what Vajda (1947) has called the “unstationary community” of lives, namely where deaths at any epoch are immediately replaced by an equivalent number of births. It was Moser too (1926) who coined the expression “steady state” for the stationary community in which the age distribution at any time follows the life table (King, 1887). With such a distinguished actuarial history, excellently summarized by Saxer (1958, Ch. IV), it behoves every actuary to know at least the definitions and modus operandi of today's so-called renewal (point), or recurrent event, processes.     

Revisiting the theory of optimum currency areas: Is the CFA franc zone sustainable?

This paper aims at explaining why the CFA countries have successfully maintained a currency union for several decades, despite failing to meet many of optimum currency area criteria. We suggest that the CFA zone, while not optimal, has been at least sustainable. We test this sustainability hypothesis by relying on the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach. In particular, we assess and compare the convergence process of real exchange rates towards equilibrium for the CFA zone countries and a sample of other sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Our findings evidence that internal and external balances have been fostered and adjustments facilitated in the CFA zone as a whole—compared to other SSA countries—as well as in each of its member countries.     

Impatience implication of weakly Paretian orders: Existence and genericity

We study order theoretic and topological implications for impatience of weakly Paretian, representable orders on infinite utility streams. As a departure from the traditional literature, we do not make any continuity assumptions in proving the existence of impatient points. Impatience is robust in the sense that there are uncountably many impatient points. A general statement about genericity of impatience cannot be made for representable, weakly Paretian orders. This is shown by means of an example. If we assume a stronger sensitivity condition, then genericity obtains.     

Another Graphical Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Arrow's (1951) Impossibility Theorem is the idea that, given several well-known assumptions, the social orderings of particular alternatives that are meant to reflect individuals' preferences must match the preferences of an arbitrary individual (the dictator). A social-choice rule other than dictatorship is impossible. Following from Fountain (2000), the author presents another graphical proof of the theorem that is intended to be more accessible to students and teachers of economics. The principal strength of this approach is that the patterns of agreements and conflicts over all possible combinations of two individuals' rankings of alternatives are transparent; appreciating these patterns is the key to intuitively understanding Arrow's theorem. A self-test for readers (or a classroom exercise for students) is included.     

成本分担博弈与维克里拍卖机制研究

成本分担博弈中的平均分担机制往往导致参与人低报自己的收益率,从而导致博弈结果的无效率。笔者通过在成本分担博弈中引入维克里机制,利用参与人的占优策略——说真话,使成本分担博弈的结果实现了帕累托最优配置。